Authored on May 1, 2004

Reintroduction There is a very simple fact that needs to be realized by the majority of the country. We are at war. Iraq is not some outside auxiliary that the President is obsessed with. They have been very real and active participants in state sponsored terrorism. Iraq is now faced with the dual dilemma that the majority wants the absolute power that they previously suffered under while the minority wants the absolute power that they enjoyed under Sadaam. In the meantime there are Al Qaeda terrorists and Iranians that are actively inciting insurgencies.

So how do we win that portion of the war on terror? We must fight to win; we must stop telling the troops that they only need to be in Iraq for a set amount of time; we must threaten and be willing to use any weapon in our arsenal. This is part one and it deals with why we have to actually try to win at all costs the War On Terrorism as well as each battle within.

Morale Issues... What is the main ingredient to morale and success? Focus on the goal. Completion of that goal and getting to that goal gives soldiers drive, focus and keeps morale up. There are many questions to ask about this topic. Why is it that the troops in World War II were driven more on defeating the enemy than returning home? Why is it that morale was so low in Vietnam? Why (according to the hard-left network media) is it that there have been constant reports of lowered morale now in Iraq? What were there so few reports of low morale in Afghanistan, in Special Ops units or during the actual ground assault into Iraq?

The answer is quite simple. What is the goal? For each troop there are larger goals. For example in World War II the main goal was defeating the Germans and the Japanese. In Vietnam it was staying alive for 13 months to be able to go home. In Afghanistan the main goal was to end the Taliban's reign. Each situation the morale was as good as each unit's drive toward the goal. At the end of each mission in Vietnam most of the troops would return to camp and be content. It was less about beating the Vietcong than it was one day closer to going home. They were successful while the overall big picture mission may have been a failure.

...Morale & Success The troops should not be told that their tours of duty in Iraq will be a certain set time. They should be deployed for an undetermined length of tour. The military mission is war for a goal not for 12-month summer camps. The morale of the troops will remain more upbeat than not. Instead of being given a calendar date of return they need to be given a task accomplish and told that after such accomplishment they will go home.

Instituting a 12 & out policy in Iraq is very troubling because of the damage to morale. The morale problem is one of the main inhibitors to success in Iraq (or anywhere else). The other is the "green factor." This is the fact that every twelve months the units doing a job are completely green, or new, to the realities of the area. The troops in-field training will start from zero. The acclamation of local customs is essential to the extension of good-will and building trust with the friendly nationals. By removing troops every 12-months this aspect of good will is lost.

The other danger is that if there comes a need to extend by any length will devastate troop morale and annihilate the support of the familial support. There is little reason to believe that plans in a war will change. Changes in war plans will frequently result in in the need for troops to have their tours of duty extended in Iraq. Extension is a reality of war.

There are two ways to handle this reality. It can either be negated by not having set lengths of tours for troops. This option means that troops would not even be aware the circumstances caused them to stay longer. The other option is to tell troops they will only be in Iraq for a set time and then finding instances where that promise has to be revoked. This option, as we have discussed already, causes a paralyzing drop in morale and has the extra detriment of destroying the very fragile support from family members.

The necessary choice is to not have definitive tours of duty.